Building a sustainable mobility system is not primarily a question of physics or engineering.
It is a question of incentives, lock-in, capital allocation, and coordination.

Markets, capitalism, and funding mechanisms impose hard constraints. Ignoring them does not make them disappear; This page is an attempt to take those constraints seriously, not to complain about them, but to design within them.

I - Markets are Mercyless

Markets do not optimize for justice, sustainability, or long-term collective outcomes but only for pareto-efficiency.
They optimize only under strict assumptions:

  • competition is fair
  • information is available
  • switching costs are low
  • feedback is fast

Mobility violates all of these.

The result is not efficiency, but path dependence: once a system is built, the cheapest move is to keep using it, even if it is globally worse.

Cars dominate not because they are optimal, but because:

  • infrastructure is already paid for
  • regulations are written around them
  • habits and skills are formed around them
  • alternatives must compete against sunk costs

This is not a moral failure. It is an economic one.

A Pareto-efficient outcome can still be absurd.
(A system where a few thousand people own more wealth than billions of others is Pareto-efficient too.)[https://wir2026.wid.world/insight/global-economic-inequity/]

The relevant question is therefore not:
“Why don’t markets choose better mobility?”
but:
“Where do markets misprice costs and benefits and can we exploit that gap?”

II - Moloch

Unchecked competition often produces what (Scott Alexander describes as Moloch traps)[https://www.slatestarcodexabridged.com/Meditations-On-Moloch]:
situations where individually rational choices lead to collectively worse outcomes.

Classic examples include:

  • arms races
  • overfishing
  • race-to-the-bottom labor practices

Mobility is no different.

  • Individuals choose cars because infrastructure and safety reward them
  • Cities design for cars because voters already drive
  • Companies build cars because that’s where demand and capital already are

No one is irrational.
The equilibrium is still destructive.

From a “god’s-eye view,” cooperation would clearly dominate.
From inside the system, unilateral deviation is punished.

Don’t blame the players, blame the rules…

III - The Véli Paradox: Too Late, Too Early

The emergence of véli (véhicules intermédiaires légers) or LEVs across Europe is not accidental.
They respond to a real discomfort: cars are oversized for daily life, yet alternatives feel incomplete.

And yet, most of these projects stall.

Why?

Because they sit between two systems that already work:

  • Bicycles, which are cheap, regulated, repairable, culturally accepted, and infrastructure-compatible
  • Cars, which handle edge cases at massive scale

Any véli must survive three brutal comparisons:

  1. Against the bike: cost, simplicity, regulation, repairability
  2. Against the car: comfort, perceived safety, legitimacy
  3. Against inertia: doing nothing costs nothing

If a véli is only slightly better on a few dimensions, it loses.

As Philippe Meda argues in
“The Véli Question: Can a ‘good’ idea become a market?”
markets do not buy virtue. They buy outcomes.

IV - Reframing the Problem: Who Pays, Who Uses, Who Benefits

A useful way to de-romanticize mobility is to split roles.

1. Who pays?

  • Households (purchase, insurance, maintenance)
  • Cities (infrastructure, parking, enforcement)
  • Society (health costs, pollution, climate, direct and indirect subsidies)

2. Who uses?

  • Often one adult
  • Vehicles idle most of the time
  • Capacity massively underutilized

3. Who benefits?

  • Individual: flexibility, time savings
  • Employer: punctuality, labor pool from a much larger area
  • A few big company: Selling oil, selling parts, selling cars, selling insurance, …
  • Society: suffer from externalities

Cars collapse these roles into one illusion:
the user thinks they pay the full cost, but they don’t.

V - Economic Choice Under Real-Life Constraints

This builds on the motility framework introduced earlier.
We treat access, competence, and appropriation as given constraints that shape economic behavior.
What follows focuses strictly on cost structures, substitution thresholds, and economic choice.

People do not choose mobility modes by optimizing energy, speed, or emissions.
They choose among viable options given their income, habits, household structure, and coordination needs.

1 - A few Household Mobility Scenarios, Public Transport, and Feasible Choices

Mobility choices emerge from the interaction between public transport pricing, coordination needs, and redundancy costs. Public transport can either simplify life by replacing cars or, paradoxically, make alternatives harder to justify once it is already paid for. We describe a few broad category. they are not exaustive and come along a spectrum of individual with unique lives but will help for this argument.

A) Dense urban, aligned life

Home, work, and social life are concentrated within a dense urban fabric, with frequent and reliable public transport.

  • Urban PT subscription: ~120–180 CHF / month
  • Walking, bike, cargo bike
  • Car: optional or absent

Here, public transport acts as a coordination backbone.
Once the subscription is paid, marginal trips feel “free,” lowering the incentive to add another vehicle.

Economically and functionally, the bike-PT system already dominates.
A véli struggles to justify itself unless it replaces specific trips that PT handles poorly (time, comfort, reliability), which is rare in this context.

B) City-to-city commuter

Regular long-distance travel between major urban centers.

  • General pass (AG): ~450 CHF / month
  • Car: generally hight in total cost, higher stress and variability

The AG creates a high sunk cost with maximal coverage.
Once paid, it crowds out intermediate solutions: adding a light vehicle does not reduce the PT cost and add little marginal utility.

Light vehicles do not compete here - neither economically nor cognitively.

C) Peri-urban or rural household

Dispersed activities, weaker public transport, overlapping schedules.

  • Public transport: limited, fragmented, often still paid (partial subscriptions, school passes)
  • Primary car: unavoidable
  • Second car: enables independence and schedule overlap

Here, public transport is neither cheap enough nor comprehensive enough to act as a backbone.
Instead, it coexists with the car without removing the need for redundancy.

The second car exists as a coordination failure buffer, not because it is loved, but because schedules break without it and public transport are not viable either economically or practically.

The only scenario where economic substitution is plausible is by replacing redundancy.

2 - The Reference Cost: A Typical Second Car (CH)

For households in scenario C, the second car defines part of the economic benchmark.

A conservative monthly cost breakdown in Switzerland:

  • Purchase amortization: 150–800 CHF
  • Insurance & taxes: 20-50 CHF
  • Fuel / electricity: 20–200 CHF
  • Maintenance & tires: 10–250 CHF
  • Parking (often ignored): 50–150 CHF

Total: ~250–1450 CHF / month

This cost is widely tolerated because it is:

  • fragmented across categories
  • partly invisible (depreciation, parking)
  • normalized by long-standing car dependency

Public transport costs do not eliminate this expense;
they often stack on top of it, increasing total household mobility spending.

3 - The 100–200 CHF / Month Substitution Window

Once the second-car cost is made explicit, a hard constraint appears.

To substitute meaningfully, an alternative must sit well below the marginal cost of redundancy and below the psychological threshold from public transport.

  • <100 CHF / month
    → low-friction experimentation, easy addition alongside PT
  • 100–150 CHF / month
    → rational second-car substitution
  • >200 CHF / month
    → ideological or hobbyist choice

Above 200 CHF / month, an alternative no longer competes with a second car.
It competes with values, identity, or novelty but not budgets.

This window defines upper bounds on:

  • manufacturing cost
  • acceptable lifespan assumptions
  • insurance and liability models
  • maintenance burden
  • financing structure

These are not design preferences.
They are economic thresholds.

4 - Economic Implication for Neodrive

Neodrive does not target:

  • primary car replacement
  • dense urban cores
  • long-distance commuting

Its economic hypothesis is narrow:

A vehicle that replaces the second car’s function
while undercutting its monthly marginal cost.

To remain within the substitution window, this implies:

  • extreme durability
  • minimal depreciation
  • low insurance exposure
  • predictable maintenance
  • capital-light production choices

Any design choice that violates these constraints is not a trade-off.
It is a disqualifier.

5 - Value Creation, Capture, and Distribution

In this framework:

  • User values independence and reduced coordination cost
  • Payer seeks lower monthly outlay than a second car
  • Beneficiary society and the planet (hopefully)

Value is created by:

  • reducing redundant capital
  • lowering fixed mobility costs
  • maintaining autonomy without escalation

What is clear is the non-goal:

  • extracting rent
  • feature gating
  • planned obsolescence

6 - Economic Scope and Scale

This is not a mass-market ambition.

  • TAM: all multi-car households
  • SAM: households with short-to-medium daily trips and bike-compatible infrastructure
  • SOM: households willing to substitute redundancy with a non-car vehicle

The SOM is small by design.
Viability here depends on stability, not volume.

7 - What This Chapter Establishes

This chapter does not argue that Neodrive will succeed.
It establishes the economic conditions under which it could.

If the vehicle cannot:

  • stay below the 150 CHF / month threshold
  • replace second-car functionality
  • avoid increasing coordination or cognitive cost

then no amount of ethical intent or technical elegance will compensate.

Markets do not negotiate with good intentions. They only respond to relieved constraints.

VI - Industrial Reality and Value Lock-In

Cars are cheap not because they are elegant.
They are cheap because they are standardized mistakes produced billions of times.

This creates brutal advantages:

  • custom parts at near-raw-material cost
  • amortized tooling and certification
  • massive learning curves

Small-scale innovation is punished:

  • bespoke components destroy economies of scale
  • certification costs do not scale down
  • supply chains do not care about ethics

This is value lock-in.

For Neodrive, the implication is clear:

We cannot out-car the car.

We must:

  • reuse existing industrial ecosystems
  • rely on commodity parts
  • prioritize repairability over optimization
  • accept imperfection and tradeoff

A unperfect vehicle that lasts 20 years beats a beautiful and expensive one that never make it on the market.

VII - Ethics Without Illusions

Markets do not reward virtue.
They sometimes tolerate it when it is cheap.

Our ethical constraints are not selling points:

  • long lifespan
  • repair-first design
  • open knowledge
  • refusal of rent extraction

These do not justify existence.
They justify how we operate if existence is earned.

Ethics are just extra constraints (economically speaking), and moral is not rewarded by the market.

VIII - What Neodrive Is Actually Trying to Prove

Neodrive is not a promise.
It is a test.

We aim to explore whether a vehicle can:

  • replace a second car and reduce negative externalities on the environment
  • cost less than 150 CHF / month
  • integrate into bicycle infrastructure
  • rely on existing industrial parts
  • last 20+ years
  • without betting on regulatory miracles

all of that to get a foodhold to drive the economy of scale lower and hopefully start to replace the rest of the cars by being brutally cheaper.

In practive that mean designing a vehicle that can cost less than 5k CHF from a volume of a dozens per years.